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Understanding mental disorder is necessary for understanding the kinds of creatures we are, and for a complete philosophy of mind. As Derek Bolton notes, extant philosophical theories of mind imply accounts of mental disorders. In his view, the connection lies in identifying “radical failures of intentionality” that occur in mental disorder. ​[2]​  Such a radical failure can be illustrated using the case of a hallucination. Healthy persons typically perceive the world as it is (however it may be). Perceptions are intentional states, insofar as they are directed at or about the world. The intentionality of one’s perception is appropriate insofar as one experiences the world as it roughly is. In a hallucination the intentionality of perception is flawed, insofar as non-existent items or qualities are perceived as real. Hallucinatory experiences radically fail to track the world. 




Matthew Ratcliffe claims that understanding Capgras and Cotard delusions requires understanding patients’ phenomenology.​[4]​ In Capgras delusions, patients insist that an imposter has replaced a familiar person. In Cotard delusions, the patient insists that she herself is in some sense not real; she claims to be ‘dead,’ ‘non-existent,’ or ‘disembodied.’ Those who suffer such delusions have a diminished experience of what Ratcliffe calls “affective feelings of familiarity.”  
Affective feelings are standard fare: “phenomenally accessible feelings” of changes in one’s body.​[5]​  It’s the “of familiarity” that raises eyebrows. In Ratcliffe’s view, we can experience people, objects, and places as familiar or unfamiliar. Ratcliffe describes feelings of, e.g., a spouse’s familiarity as arising from a set of expected patterns of mutual “affective relatedness” between them and oneself.​[6]​ With experience, one comes to understand how one’s spouse will think, feel, behave, and react to one’s own style of social engagement. These past experiences establish expectancies that are incorporated into one’s present experience of the person. Past experiences underwrite what I call “affective know-how” concerning how one expects social exchanges to proceed. The person’s familiarity is felt in an experience of bodily expectations about how the two of you will relate, and how you will each feel as interaction unfolds. 
These claims can be understood on analogy with Alva Noë’s embodied/situated approach to visual perception, according to which visual perception, and its content, is constituted by sensorimotor know-how, derived from previous exploration.​[7]​  On Noë’s view, there is a puzzle about visual experience. For example, how can one have a visual experience of, e.g., a whole cat, despite the fact that from any given perspective, its near side occludes its far side? On Noë’s account, such an experience “consists in [one’s] expectation that by moving [one’s] body [one] can produce the right sort of ‘new cat’ stimulation”.​[8]​ If one’s expectations were to be flouted – say, if exploration revealed only a convincing ‘cat façade’ – this too would be incorporated into one’s experience, making the cat’s status as a fiction all too apparent, even upon returning to your original vantage.
As I read Ratcliffe’s account, something akin occurs in Capgras and Cotard delusions. In such delusions, capacities of perceptual recognition are intact, but with abnormal affect. Capgras delusions are understood as stemming from diminished felt affect. Normally, (sensu Noë), affective know-how partially constitutes one’s experience of familiarity. In the delusional patient, diminished felt affect during interchange means that these expectations are flouted – one does not feel as one expects one should. This is incorporated into experience, and patients thus find well-known people to feel unfamiliar, superficial appearances notwithstanding. Cotard delusions are understood as stemming from deleted felt affect. Deleted affect flouts nearly all bodily expectations. Even expectations about oneself are flouted – one patient, after the delusion had subsided, claimed to have felt “nothing inside.”​[9]​ A fortiori, the patient did not feel as they expected themselves to feel. As a result, patients find their own corporeal self to feel unfamiliar. Using the façade analogy: all the world feels like a stage.
Given the analogy with Noë, calling Ratcliffe’s view an ‘embodied/situated’ account is intended to be consistent with what he has in mind when he writes that “the [felt] familiarity of things is partly constituted by a bodily feeling”.​[10]​  It is (i) embodied because of its dependence on bodily feelings, and (ii) situated because of its dependence on affective know-how – felt expectations of bodily feelings, gleaned from prior experiences in similar situations. To this extent, I take Ratcliffe’s phenomenological claims to cohere with the literature on embodied/situated cognition.​[11]​ 
However, before the implications of Ratcliffe’s view can be considered, it behooves me to make sense of another, seemingly-contradictory claim Ratcliffe makes about the relation between bodily feelings and feelings of familiarity:

[U]nlike feelings such as cramps or stomach aches, this feeling of familiarity is not properly characterized as an ‘internal’ report of bodily states. Its phenomenology is neither ‘external’ nor ‘internal’. Instead it comprises a background orientation within which experiential judgments of internality and externality are made.​[12]​

I said above that a conscious experience of familiarity is partially constituted by bodily feelings, via affective know-how. But bodily feelings are the sort of ‘internal’ report Ratcliffe eschews as an understanding of feelings of familiarity. Bodily feelings are directed at parts of one’s innervated body. To bring in the term of art that will preoccupy us, the ‘intentional objects’ of bodily feelings are within one’s body. According to the passage above, the phenomenology of familiarity is presupposed by awareness of a bodily feeling. How can bodily feelings both constitute and presuppose feelings of familiarity? And what does this mean for their intentionality? 

3	Goldie’s Phenomenology of Emotions 

A solution to this puzzle can be extracted from Peter Goldie’s ‘feeling theory’ of the emotions. ​[13]​  Furthermore, under a certain interpretation, Goldie’s account sits well with Ratcliffe’s, and allows for a richer embodied/situated account of these delusions. In section 2.1 I provide this reading of Goldie’s theory.  In 2.2, the intentionality of emotional experience is brought center-stage, and the tools for solving Ratcliffe’s puzzle are set out. In section 3 I offer a solution to the puzzle, then conclude in section 4 by returning to assess the import of my account for Bolton’s ‘failures of intentionality’.

3.1	Bodily Feelings and Feeling Towards

Goldie distinguishes two types of emotional feelings. The first are a subset of bodily feelings, specifically consciousness awareness of bodily changes that occur during emotions (muscle activity, autonomic nervous system responses, and hormonal changes). The second type of emotional feelings are what Goldie calls “feeling-towards.”  These are characterized as phenomenally-charged psychological attitudes. 

“Feeling towards is unreflective emotional engagement with the world beyond the body; it is not a consciousness of oneself, either of one’s bodily condition or of oneself as experiencing an emotion…”​[14]​ 

Note, first, a characterization of feeling towards as an “unreflective” experience – by which Goldie means that an experience of feeling towards need not presuppose a capacity for reflective self-awareness. Specifically, one can unreflectively feel an emotion without being reflectively aware that one is feeling an emotion. The same goes for visual perception: I can unreflectively have a visual perception of an apple without being reflectively aware that I am seeing an apple. Second, feeling-towards is characterized as an engagement with ‘external’ properties of the world beyond the body. Feelings towards thus have an intentional object outside the body, whereas bodily feelings have intentional objects within the body. Finally, there is the notion of ‘engagement.’ Elaborating elsewhere, Goldie says that emotional engagement typically involves being “poised for action in a new way – poised for action out of the emotion.”​[15]​ 
This notion of ‘engagement’, combined with the prominent role of bodily feelings, provides the foundation for an embodied/situated reading of Goldie’s view. To see this, consider Goldie’s further distinction between feeling towards and propositional attitudes, like beliefs. ​[16]​ Imagine believing of some object, like a cliff, that it is dangerous. According to Goldie, when one shifts from this intellectual attitude to the emotional attitude of feeling fear towards the cliff, the intentional object of the psychological state – the way the cliff is ‘grasped’ – changes. One feels the dangerousness of the cliff – one is emotionally engaged, fearfully engaged with it. As Goldie puts it, the emotion’s “phenomenology infuses both attitude and content” ​[17]​
I submit that Goldie’s notion of ‘emotional engagement’ is readily understood in terms of affective know-how concerning one’s relation to the cliff. One has a felt bodily expectation of harm, should one fail to avoid the cliff, and this possibility for (negative) affective relatedness with the cliff is incorporated into one’s present experience. Such bodily expectations partially constitute one’s experience of feeling fear towards the cliff. 
This link between Goldie and Ratcliffe is, I think, a good thing for an embodied/ situated account of these delusions. Take Capgras: surely many bodily expectations one feels towards a spouse are decidedly emotional in character. Goldie’s account offers a way to integrate this straightaway. Since affective know-how concerns expectations about bodily feelings, and since some bodily feelings are emotionally relevant, emotional bodily expectations can likewise be integrated into experience. A closer examination of the intentionality of feeling towards provides the tools to solve Ratcliffe’s puzzle.


3.2	Feeling Towards via Bodily Feeling

Goldie introduces a novel idea he calls “borrowed intentionality.” Some emotionally relevant bodily feelings are not consciously apprehended as “pure” bodily feelings. They are not merely experiences about one’s body, but rather exhibit “borrowed intentionality.” Goldie provides as an example the bodily feelings of a ‘grief-pang’, contrasted with a ‘mere-pang’ in the chest, absent the emotion of grief.​[18]​ The grief-pang, he writes, “is for the one who is being grieved over; although it is undoubtedly a feeling of something bodily, and can be pointed to as being in the breastbone, [being directed toward the loss is] what makes it a pang of grief, rather than any old pang...”​[19]​ 
Goldie’s point concerns the consciously accessible intentional object of one’s experience of the pang. A (mere) bodily feeling, by definition, has as its intentional object a part of one’s body. But the grief-pang seems to be more than this.  In addition to being a bodily feeling, directed at the breastbone, it is also directed at the lost loved one. It is what I will call a bodily-feeling-towards the loss. As a grief-pang – a bodily feeling specifically associated with the emotion of grief – it borrows the intentional object of grief, and is consciously apprehended as a bodily-feeling-towards the loss. 
A seemingly reasonable question would be: “Well, which is it? Is it a feeling of the body, or a feeling toward the loss?” I suggest (going beyond Goldie) that we can have it both ways, but not at once. A conscious experience of a single, current bodily state can be consciously apprehended as being directed at the body at one moment, and can be apprehended as being directed at the world the next. When the latter occurs, we experience states of our bodies as properties of the environment. ​[20]​
Daniel Dennett tells a pair of tales that will help me to express this. Dennett invites the reader to pick up a pen or pencil and, closing their eyes, use the ‘wand’ to touch nearby objects. Dennett expects the reader will be able to determine the textures of objects the wand is touching “effortlessly – as if your nervous system has sensors out at the tip of the wand.”​[21]​ He provides a more striking example. When taking a curve in a car on the highway, we can feel a slippery patch of oil under the tires. As Dennett puts it, “the phenomenological focal point of contact is the point where the rubber meets the road, not any point in your innervated body…”​[22]​
Then again, Dennett notes, with “a special, and largely ineffectual, effort”, one can “attend to the way the stick feels at your fingertips”.​[23]​ Well, which is it? A feeling of the body holding the wand, or a feeling of objects the wand is touching? Both, but not at once. With special (broadly attentional) effort, one can shift the phenomenological focal point back into one’s body, apprehending the changes at one’s fingertips as feelings of one’s own body. But normally (again, Dennett notes) proximal stimulations at the fingertips are simply integrated by the brain into the conscious experience of textual qualities of distal objects themselves. 
My own central proposal is to capture the difference between, say, a mere-pang and a grief-pang, as a difference in phenomenological focal point (hereafter, ‘phocal point’). Normally, in grief, the proximal changes in one’s body are simply integrated (by the brain) into the conscious experience of the emotional relevance of a distal state of affairs – the loss. Our bodily feelings become a phenomenological lens, through which we experience an object in the word as emotionally salient.​[24]​ When involved in an emotional feeling towards, bodily feelings don’t just borrow intentionality, they loan out phenomenology. The phocal point is out there, with the loss, not in your innervated body. It is the loss that is felt as grievous, via the pang in one’s chest.
To put things bluntly, I am suggesting that when the average person stands near a cliff and feels fear towards it, they are (unknowingly) consciously apprehending their own bodily states (autonomic nervous system responses, muscle activity, and hormonal changes) as properties of the cliff. I add one qualification. As per the foregoing, I retain a role for bodily expectations (affective know-how) to partially constitute one’s experience of properties of the environment. ​[25]​ I don’t suppose that the average person feels pain when standing near the cliff; only that they have a bodily expectation of harm.




We can now solve Ratcliffe’s puzzle. First, the puzzle: a feeling of “the familiarity of things is partly constituted by a bodily feeling”, yet feelings of familiarity comprise “a background orientation within which experiential judgments of internality and externality are made.​[27]​  Which is it? Both, but not at once.
Let’s be clear about a disanalogy between Goldie and Ratcliffe. Unlike emotional feeling-towards, which wax and wane, Ratcliffe takes feelings of familiarity to be a constant and ubiquitous element of experience. Take an analogy from vision. Vision is (nearly) ‘always on’, providing us with a rich experience of the world around us. Against the background orientation of the visual field, one can focus (standard, no “ph-“) on different elements within the field. One can peer at one’s own limbs, or gaze at a nearby cliff. Feelings of familiarity, similarly, are ‘always on’, and provide us with an experience of ourselves in the world via a ‘phenomenal field’.​[28]​ It is against this backdrop that one can phocus on different elements within the field. 
That, then, is how an experiential judgment that one’s bodily feelings are ‘internal’ – hence, properly bodily – presupposes the backdrop of feelings of familiarity. In order to apprehend bodily feelings as states of one’s body, attentional effort is required to phocus on a proximal portion of the phenomenal field. One phocuses not on the person/object that is felt as familiar, but rather on the bodily feelings that are typically integrated into one’s conscious experience of familiarity. Just like fingertips when holding a wand. Just like the mere pang in grief.​[29]​ 
What, then, of the “constitution” claim? The phenomenology of feelings of familiarity is, as Ratcliffe claims, partially constituted by the phenomenology of bodily feelings, as I have construed them. First, occurrent and expected bodily feelings function as a phenomenological lens through which we feel the world, and the possibilities it offers. This affective know-how partially constitutes the phenomenal field (sensu Noë). We now have a further account of how this is so. Similar to the case of grief-pangs, the phenomenology of affective familiarity is loaned to objects in the world via associated bodily feelings. Similar to the cliff, bodily feelings form the basis of bodily expectations. That, then, is the way in which bodily feelings partially constitute an occurrent experience of a person as familiar. When felt affect is diminished or deleted, one’s present experience is stripped of feelings of familiarity. On the embodied/situated view, Capgras and Cotard delusions are delusions of disembodiment. 

5	Conclusion –Intentionality and Mental Disorder

As noted at the outset, Derek Bolton has considered whether mental disorders might be specified by a class of “radical failures” of intentionality, exhibited in the patient’s mental life.​[30]​ 

[T]he mind is in good working order to the extent that its intentional objects and connections are appropriate… failure of intentionality, whether inappropriateness of an intentional object or connection, or absence of an intentional object altogether, suggests disorder. ​[31]​ 

The foregoing account of Capgras and Cotard delusions sits well with this claim. Patients lose conscious access to normal intentional objects of affective experience, explaining the delusion. An absence of an intentional object, just as Bolton describes. We can also be a bit more precise. These patients have not lost, in toto, mental states whose intentional objects are familiar people, or themselves. Thus they report that their alleged spouse feels unfamiliar, or that their body is not real. It is only the patient’s affective experience that is restricted to a subset (or, null-set) of appropriate intentional objects. Notably, however, this very fact rationalizes the patients’ actions: the intentional connections between delusions and behavior are appropriate, given their experiences. 
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